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Schaub: The "Substantially Younger" Requirement in O'Conner v. Consolidat

THE "SUBSTANTIALLY YOUNGER"
REQUIREMENT IN O'CONNOR v. CONSOLIDATED
COIN CATERERS CORP.:
WILL ADEA PLAINTIFFS LOSE AGAIN?
I. INTRODUCTION
For more than thirty years, the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act ("ADEA" or "the Act")' has been the law of the land, seeking to
combat age bias in the workplace.2 Over the years, the ADEA has been
expanded to cover a wider range of people. When it was first passed in
1967, the Act protected people who were between forty and sixty-five
years old.' The ceiling for ADEA protection was raised to seventy years
of age in 1978,4 then removed altogether in 1986. 5 In fact, the ADEA
enjoyed widespread support from the public. However, there are now
two powerful social trends in place which are going to make public support for the ADEA even stronger. The first trend is the changing age
profile of the American public.7 The second is an economic transforma-

tion which is undermining American job stability.8
Both of these changes are coming up a counter-trend in the courts

which is making the ADEA less available to plaintiffs. This Note will
1. Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 (1967) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634
(1994)).
2. See id. § 621(4)(b). "It is... the purpose of this [Act] to promote employment of older
persons based on their ability rather than their age." Id.
3. See id. § 631(a).
4. See Age Discrimination in Employment Amendments, Pub. L. No. 95-256, 92 Stat. 189,

190 (1978).
5. See Age Discrimination in Employment Amendments, Pub. L. No. 99-592, 100 Stat.
3342,3344 (1986).
6. See, e.g., McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publ'g Co., 513 U.S. 352, 357 (1995) (noting
that the ADEA "reflects a societal condemnation of invidious bias in employment decisions");
Thornbrough v. Columbus & Greenville R.R., 760 F.2d 633, 637 (5th Cir. 1985) (noting that passage of the ADEA is a recognition that "one of the tests of a civilized society is its treatment of the
elderly").
7. See infra notes 17-27 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 28-34 and accompanying text.
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give a brief description of how demographics and economics will increase the demand for the ADEA as a remedy and then examine how a
third social trend, this one legal, has been working to limit the ADEA's
availability.9 The trend to narrow the ADEA is evident in several recent
Supreme Court decisions which have made it more difficult for age discrimination plaintiffs to make their prima facie case.'0 Specifically, this
Note will focus on the recent Supreme Court decision in O'Connor v.
Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp.," a case which is generally thought
of as helpful for plaintiffs, and will demonstrate how it could actually
make things harder for plaintiffs.
The Supreme Court's holding in O'Connor is a bit of a paradox.
One the one hand, it clearly helps plaintiffs by expanding the number of
situations in which the ADEA may apply. The O'Connordecision does
this by no longer requiring that plaintiffs who have been laid off, demoted, etc. in favor of younger employees show that those younger2
employees were outside of the protected age group (i.e., under forty).
In practical terms this means that employees in their fifties and sixties
who are laid off will still be able to sue under the ADEA if their re3
placements are also over the age of forty (as will usually be the case).
However, at the same time that O'Connoropens up the number of
situations where the ADEA might apply, the decision also contains language that may harm plaintiffs. It could do this by placing limits on the
statistics that plaintiffs are allowed to use when making their prima facie case. Limitations could arise because the O'Connor ruling requires
that plaintiffs show that the alleged beneficiaries of employer age discrimination are employees who are "substantially younger" than the
plaintiffs. 4 To demonstrate how this requirement can affect the plaintiffs' case, this Note will set up a hypothetical layoff situation and run
an analysis on the numbers
both with and without a "substantially
5
requirement.
younger"

9. See infra notes 72-88 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 72-88 and accompanying text.
11. 517 U.S. 308 (1996).
12. See O'Connor,517 U.S. at 312.
13. See McCorstin v. United States Steel Corp., 621 F.2d 749, 753-54 (5th Cir. 1980)
(noting that "[s]eldom will a 60-year old be replaced by a person in [his] twenties").
14. See O'Connor, 517 U.S. at 313. "In the age-discrimination context... an inference of
[discrimination] can not be drawn from the replacement of one worker with another worker insubstantially younger." Id.
15. See infra Section V.
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Finally, a few policy suggestions will be made for lower courts
applying O'Connor so that the decision can remain beneficial to plaintiffs. 6 With the right interpretation of "substantially younger," the
O'Connor requirement will not further limit the availability of the
ADEA. It is important for the ADEA to be interpreted in a "plaintiff
friendly" way, given the new social trends which Americans are facing.
These trends are sure to increase both age discrimination and the need
for the Act's protection.
11. BABY BOOMERS AND THE ADEA
The first social trend to increase demand for the ADEA is the result
of changing demographics. The Baby Boomers have now aged to the
point where even the youngest members of that generation will soon be
within the ADEA's protected class. 7 While this population bulge passes

the forty year mark, medical innovation continues to increase the expected American lifespan.'" There is even evidence of an increasing average "health span" - the number of years that people remain in good
health.' 9 This new longevity means that present-day retirees are spending more healthy years in retirement than ever before. These longer
lifespans are creating similar expectations for long retirements among
the Baby Boom generation. 2
Some of these expectations, however, may be foiled by other Baby
Boomer circumstances. A recent study found that Baby Boomers will

have to triple their current rate of savings, on average, in order to maintain their present standards of living after retirement.2 ' But in fact, since
16. See infra Section VI.
17. See Simon J. Nadel, Graying Baby Boomers Raise Issues of Discrimination, Manage-

ment Styles, Employment Policy & Law Daily (BNA), at D3 (Apr. 1, 1997) (noting that the median age of the American worker will climb from 37.6 in 1994 to 40.6 by the year 2005).
18.

See CENTER FOR DIsEASE CONTROL, 46 MORBIDrrY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 941-

943 (1997). As of 1996, this lifespan stood at 76.1 years, breaking the record of 75.8 years set in
1992 and 1995. See id.
19. See K.G. Manton et al., Chronic Disability Trends in Elderly United States Populations:
1982-1994, 94 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. Sci. USA 2593-98 (1997).
20. See Steven Kaye, Stop Working? Not Boomers, U.S. NEwS & WORLD REP., June 12,

1995, at 70. Only 10% of Baby Boomers currently expect to work past the age of 65. See id.
21. See Helen Dennis & John Migliaccio, Redefining Retirement: The Baby Boomer Challenge, 21 GENERATIONS 45, 47 (1997) (citing a survey done by Merrill Lynch). "Much of the con-

troversy surrounding the adequacy of boomer savings for their economic security rests on assumptions about the inclusion of home equity, its potential value to boomers, and the willingness and
ability of boomers to use home equity for retirement funding." Id. The current group of retirees has
not "spent down" housing equity, however. See Death, and Taxes, ECONOMIST, Aug. 13, 1994, at
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August of 1997, in the midst of what has been one of the longest eco-

nomic expansions since World War II, the savings rate in the U.S. has
only been 3.8% of personal income.2 This rate is in contrast to the personal savings rate of more than 7% which Americans maintained
throughout the 1960s.' The result can be seen in another survey which
found that 46% of all working-age Americans have saved less than
$10,000 for retirement and that only 30% of 51- to 61-year olds have
put aside that same amount.2'
As a result, barring some sudden increase in the ability to save
more for retirement, Baby Boomers will be demanding longer working
careers and later retirements. More and more Boomers will try to work
past the age of sixty-five so they can accumulate the savings needed to
cover longer retirement periods.2 As the federal government increases
the minimum Social Security retirement age in order to keep the system
solvent,27 the demand for more working years will only be enhanced.
19, 20-21. But cf. R. Easterlin et al., Will Baby Boomers Be Less Well Off Than Their Parents?
Income, Wealth and Family Circumstances over the Life Cycle in the United States, 19 Pop. &
DEVELOP. REv. 497, 504 (1993) (finding that Boomers have most of the necessary savings needed
to retire when their housing equity is included).
22. See Jonathan Weisman, Economists View Low Savings Rate as Potential Time Bomb,
Hous. CHRON., Jan. 26, 1998, at 3.
23. See Easterlin et al., supra note 21, at 499-504. Since people in their forties and fifties
have the highest incomes and savings rates, they are the group that is most responsible for the national savings rate. See id.
24. See Editorial,PrivatizedRetirement Offers Real Security, ATLANTA J., May 23, 1997, at
A20 (citing a report from the Public Agenda Foundation based on a survey of 1200 American
homes).
25. See Paul Katzeff, Making Money in Mutuals: Roth IRA Puts New Tool in Investor's
Hands, INVESTORS Bus. DAILY, July 31, 1998 (describing attempt by Congress to make savings
more attractive). Two members of the House Ways and Means Committee, Reps. Ben Cardin (DMD) and Robert Portman (R-OH) have introduced "The Retirement Security for the 21st Century
Act" (H.R. 3788) for the purpose of encouraging more private pension and retirement plans as an
alternative to Social Security. See Robert Portman, Providinga Secure Retirementfor All Americans, Weekly Column for the Week of Aug. 17, 1998, FED. Doc. CLEARING HOUSE, available in
1998 WL 7326394; Tracey Longo, How Baby Boomers are Scaring Congress into Letting All
Americans Save More for Retirement, FINANCIAL PLANNING, June 1, 1998, availablein 1998 WL
11190067 (discussing the details of H.R. 3788).
26. See Baby Boomers Not Saving, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Feb. 11, 1998, at BI. The article
cites a survey done by Scudder Kemper Investments Inc., with help from Christopher Hayes of the
National Center for Women and Retirement Research. See id. The survey of 1000 Boomer households with annual incomes of over $30,000 found that 64% of respondents had no idea how much
money they would need to retire, 76% said that they were worried about their financial future,
68% admitted that they had planned insufficiently for retirement. See id.
27. See Roger Rosenblatt Social Security Needs to Adapt, Fed Chief Says, CHi. SuN-TIMES,
Nov. 21, 1997, at 36. The retirement age is scheduled to be slowly adjusted upward. See id. It will
be at least 67 by the year 2027. See id. Chairman of the Federal Reserve Alan Greenspan, among
others, has said that the minimum retirement age will have to be raised to above 67 in order for the
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At the same time that aging Boomers seek to extend their years in
the workforce, a second great social change is underway. The
"downsizing" movement has come in full force,2 eroding job security29
and altering the old relationships that existed between corporate employers and American workers. 0 Feeling constant pressure to maximize
profits, employers have looked for every opportunity to cut costs
through layoffs.31 Studies show older employees have been targeted with
the greatest frequency.32
The clash of demographics on the one hand, with the new economic forces on the other, has led many employment lawyers to predict
that there will be an upswing in the number of ADEA lawsuits filed.33
system to remain solvent. See id. Senator Judd Gregg (R-NH) has recommended a retirement age
of 70. See id.
28. See Louis Uchitelle & N.R. Kleinfield, On the Battlefields of Business, Millions of
Casualties, N.Y. TAIES, Mar. 3, 1996, at Al; see also CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, Displaced Workers: Trends in the 1980s and Implicationsfor the Future (Feb. 1993) (reporting th a
"[e]ach year between 1981 and 1990, an average of almost 2 million workers lost full-time jobs
and were not recalled by their former employers"); COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS, Job Creation and Employment Opportunities: The United States Labor Market, 1993-1996, 6 (Apr. 23,
1996) <http:llwhitehouse.gov/WH/EOPICEA/htmllabor.html>. 'The overall number of workers
displaced was roughly the same proportion of the workforce in 1991-2 as in 1981-2, although the
recession in the early 1980s was more severe than the one in the early 1990s." Id. This indicates
that layoffs are not just peaking during recessionary times, but are becoming more of a constant
feature of the economy. More details on worker displacement from 1995-1997 can be obtained at
<http:lstats.bls.gov/news.releaseldisp.toc.htm> (giving Bureau of Labor Statistics breakdown of
the displaced by age, race, etc).
29. See Kenneth A. Swinnerton & Howard Wial, Is Job Stability Declining in the U.S.
Economy?, 48 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REv. 293, 303 (1996) (confirming in an empirical study that
there has been greater job instability since the late 1980s).
30. See id. at 304. "[ilf the pattern [since] the late 1980s persists, workers who have stable,
long-term jobs will make up an increasingly exclusive club." Id.
31. See Uchitelle & Kleinfield, supra note 28, at 26 (attributing job loss in part to Wall
Street's insistence that companies elevate profits).
32. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, 1994 Displaced Worker Survey, tbl.I, U.S. DEP'T OF
LABOR (Feb. 1994). Table I was republished in Gary Minda, Opportunistic Downsizing of Aging
Workers: The 1990s Version ofAge and Pension Discriminationin Employment, 48 HASTINGS L.J.
511, 521 (1997). Displacement rates for workers who were 55 and older, for example, were considerably higher during the recessionary period of 1991-92 than the recessionary period of 198182. See id. Again, this was true despite the fact that the recessionary period in 1981-82 was more
severe than the 1991-2 recession. See COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS, supranote 28 at 6.
33. See Kirstin Downey Grimsley, Boomers' Nightmare: Age Discrimination,SALT LAKE
CITY TRIB., May 25, 1997, at El. "Companies need to focus on the fact that they may have a
growing problem as the baby boom [generation] ages.... Businesses will see a growth in the
number of age-discrimination cases and claims." Id. (quoting Stephen Bokat, general counsel of
the National Chamber of Commerce's Litigation Center); Lorraine LaFemina, Employees, Employers Belabor Labor Laivs, LI Bus. NEwS, Mar. 3, 1997, at 21. "Across the country, I see age
discrimination relating to downsizing the number one complaint of workers... [because] companies have used bad judgment in methodology when firing employees." Id. (quoting Murray Port-
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Some people have even speculated that the Baby Boomers' historically
high level of education (hence awareness of statutory rights), combined
with a group tendency to go "against the grain" will contribute to the

number of lawsuits."
III. NARROWING THE APPLICATION OF THE ADEA
Demographics and downsizing are the two forces which will drive
a growing demand for age discrimination lawsuits. However, they will
both come up against a movement in the courts to restrict the application of the ADEA35 and discrimination cases, in general.16 These restrictions have not slowed the enormous publicity given to spectacular
judgments and pre-trial settlements in discrimination cases, 3' but the
reality is that such suits have become more difficult to successfully
prosecute." Even though the ADEA has been limited by a series of court
decisions interpreting the Act,39 it still suffers under the same myths that
continue to surround all discrimination cases - that employers are being swamped with suit which plaintiffs usually win4' and that even
when cases settle they cost employers a fortune. The reality can be

noy, partner at the consulting and labor negotiations firm of Portnoy, Measinger, Pearl and Assocs.).
34. See Lisa Stansky, New Age Woes: Lawyers Are PreparingNow for a Possible Wave of
Age DiscriminationSuits by Baby Boomers, 83 A.B.A. J. 66 (1997). "Baby Boomers have been
raised on the notion of individual rights ... go to court, stand up for your rights. If cultural orientation matters, then I think we can expect that baby boomers are going to be suing a lot." Id. at 67
(quoting Howard Eglit, professor at Chicago-Kent College of Law).
35. See infra notes 72-88 and accompanying text.
36. See Amy Saltzman, Suppose They Sue?: Why CompaniesShouldn't Fret So Much About
Bias Cases, U.S. NEws & WoRLD REP., Sept 22, 1997, at 68, 68-70 (finding that the media's depiction of discrimination cases is distorted).
37. See id. at 68.
38. See id. at 69.
39. See infra notes 72-88 and accompanying text.
40. See Saltzman, supra note 36, at 69. In 1996, for example, there were less than six employment complaints filed with the EEOC for every 10,000 workers. See id. The 77,990 complaints filed that year for all types of discrimination claims (race, sexual harassment, disability,
etc.) need to be considered in the context of the size of the American workforce which had reached
a record 129.7 million people (11 million more than in 1992). See id.
41. See id. at 69. "[J]ob discrimination cases remain one of the single most unsuccessful
classes of litigation for plaintiffs. They settle less and lose more than almost anything else." Id.
(quoting Theodore Eisenberg, Cornell University law school professor).
42. See Saltzman, supra note 36, at 69. James Dertouzos, a senior economist at the Rand
Institute, conducted a survey of 470 wrongful dismissal cases in California between 1987 and
1994. See id. The "wrongfulness" alleged included all forms of bias, not just age discrimination.
See id. Dertouzos found that 17% of cases were dropped after initial complaint, costing employers
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seen in surveys which find an increasing ratio of cases brought to cases
won. 3 Even the number of class action suits filed by the EEOC has
plummeted. 44
To understand how the courts have limited the use of the ADEA in
the past few years, we must first look at how the burden of proof for
ADEA cases was set up in the past and how recent court decisions have
altered it. Traditionally, there have been three ways of establishing an
ADEA claim:4 (1) through direct evidence of discriminatory intent
which had an adverse effect on the plaintiff (i.e., a "smoking gun"); (2)
through the use of circumstantial evidence to show intent;46 and (3)

through statistical proof of a policy or employer action which had a disparate effect (though not necessarily intentionally) on the protected
group. Methods (1) and (2) are known as "disparate treatment," and
method (3) as "disparate impact.' 4 Method (1) usually relies on "stray
remarks" from the plaintiff's employer which show that the layoff is
due to the plaintiffs age. 49 These cases are becoming more rare as em-

less than $500 on average. See id. After a complaint is filed, the typical company spends less than
$5000 on administrative and fact-finding costs. See id. at 70.
43. See Judy Peres, Laying Off Older Workers, Legally, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 8, 1997, at 1 (citing
a study which found that employees now only prevail in 25% of cases). L. Steven Platt, who is the
president of the National Employment Lawyers Association, believes that that percentage is going
down, based on his own experience. See id. "Age-discrimination cases used to be the easiest to
bring because everybody's seen it. But now the defendants just call it a [reduction in force] and
they get away with it." Id.
44. See Saltzman, supra note 36, at 69. The number of class action suits brought has
dropped from 1174 in 1976 to only 68 in 1996. See id. This has been attributed, in part, to understaffing and underfunding at the EEOC. See id.; see also Darryl Van Duch, Paralysisfor EEOC
Feared,NAT'L L.J., Aug. 24, 1998, at 1 (reporting on congressional stalemate surrounding selection of EEOC commissioners).
45. See Verbraeken v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 881 F.2d 1041, 1045 (11th Cir. 1989);
45C AM. JuR. 2D, Job Discrimination§§ 2738-40 (1993).
46. See id. When plaintiffs have circumstantial evidence of age discrimination, the framework used for making their prima facie case is the same McDonnell Douglas framework used for
Title VII cases. See id. See infra Section Ill.A.
47. But see Jeffrey Klein & Ross Morrison, Courts Rethink ADEA Disparate-ImpactClaims,
NAT'L. L.J.,
June 30, 1997, at B10.The application of "disparate impact" to the ADEA is controversial and some commentators have said that "disparate impact" should not be available under the
ADEA after the Hazen decision. See id.
48. See Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 609 (1993). Hazen gives a summary of
the Supreme Court's past analysis of disparate treatment (based on intent), and disparate impact
(unintentional discrimination resulting from employer's policy or practice). See id. at 609-10.
49. See, e.g., Siegal v. Alpha Wire Corp., 894 F.2d 50 (3d Cir. 1990). "[O]Id dogs won't
hunt." Id. at 55. But cf., RICHARD POsNER, AGING AND OLD AGE 335 (1996). "By
now... employers have largely succeeded in purging such slogans as 'you can't teach an old dog
new tricks' from the vocabulary of their supervisory and personnel staffs." Id.
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ployers become more sophisticated in their understanding of the ADEA
and the overt behavior they need to avoid.50
Because employers are becoming more cautious, the most common
type of ADEA case uses circumstantial evidence [method (2)] to make a
case of disparate treatment. It typically involves the use of statistics to
draw an inference of employer discrimination. The structure of proof for
circumstantial "disparate treatment" cases under the ADEA has followed the same disparate treatment framework laid out in Title VII
cases. The basic framework was first outlined in the Supreme Court
case of McDonnell Douglasv. Green.5'
A. McDonnellDouglas v. Green: The Basic Framework
The ADEA was passed only three years after the passage of the
1964 Civil Rights Act5 2 which included Title VII prohibitions against
discrimination based on "race, color, religion, or national origin."53 Ever
since the passage of the two statutes, the courts have noticed that the
ADEA and Title VII are designed to ban discrimination in ways which
parallel each other.- As a result, for many years the proof scheme required for the ADEA has imitated the one required by Title VII," the socalled "McDonnell Douglas test."56
In McDonnell Douglasv. Green, the Supreme Court set up a threestep burden-shifting operation for proving cases under Title VII. In the
first step, the burden is on the plaintiff to make a prima facie case of
50.
51.
52.
53.

See id.
411 U.S. 792 (1973).
See Civil Rights Act of 1964,42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1994).
See idL

54. See Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 584 (1978) (stating that "the prohibitions of the
ADEA were derived in haec verba from Title VII."); see also Oscar Meyer & Co. v. Evans, 441
U.S. 750, 756 (1979) (observing that the ADEA and Title VII "share a common purpose, the
elimination of discrimination in the workplace").
55. See, e.g., Pena v. Brattleboro Retreat, 702 F.2d 322, 323-324 (2d Cir. 1983); Smith v.
Flax, 618 F.2d 1062, 1066 n.3 (4th Cir. 1980); Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1008 (Ist
Cir. 1979); Cova v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 574 F.2d 958, 959 (8th Cir. 1978); Rodriguez v.
Taylor, 569 F.2d 1231, 1239 (3d Cir. 1977).
56. See McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (giving the basic framework for
a Title VII case involving circumstantial evidence); see also 45C AM. JtR. 2D at § 2738
(explaining how courts have borrowed the McDonnellDouglas framework to use in ADEA cases).
A case for intentional discrimination can also be made with direct evidence in which case the
whole apparatus of McDonnellDouglas can be dispensed with. See 45C AM. JUR. 2D at § 2739. It
is rare, however, for ADEA cases to rely primarily on direct evidence. See POSNER, supra note 49,
at 335.
57. See McDonnellDouglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
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discrimination.58 McDonnell Douglas was a racial discrimination case,
so the Court ruled that the plaintiff had to show that: (1) he belonged to
a racial minority, (2) he was qualified for the job he applied for, (3) despite his qualifications, he was rejected for the job, and (4) after the rejection, the position remained open and the employer continued to seek
applicants from persons with the plaintiff's qualifications.59
In an age discrimination case, the McDonnell Douglas framework
is slightly modified.6 In that case, the plaintiffs claiming disparate

treatment must make a prima facie case by showing that they: (1) were
forty or older, (2) were qualified to do the job, (3) were fired (or not
hired, promoted, etc.) and (4) were replaced by people outside of the
protected class.6' In O'Connor,the Supreme Court ruled that element (4)
did not apply to the ADEA. This means that in the future, plaintiffs will
not have to show that replacement workers came from outside of the
protected class. 62
In general, the amount of proof that the plaintiff must present to
make the prima facie case is considered minimal.63 The prima facie case
has been kept as a low hurdle because the courts realize that it is rare for
the plaintiff to have a "smoking gun" - direct evidence of discriminatory intent.6 If the plaintiff can show the four elements listed above and
explain how they are logically connected to an inference of discrimination, then they have made a prima facie case.65 After the plaintiff does
this, the McDonnell Douglas scheme shifts the burden of production to

58. See id.
59. See id.
60. See 45C AM. Ju. 2D at § 2738.
61. See O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 307 (1997). O'Connor
changed this branch of the prima facie case so that it only requires that the replacement was
"substantially younger." See id. at 312. To simplify the discussion of the ADEA, the remainder of
this Note will focus on ADEA plaintiffs who bring suit for unlawful discharge because that was
the factual case in O'Connor.That does not mean, of course, that plaintiffs who bring suit because
they were not hired, promoted, etc. are not similarly affected by O'Connor.
62. See id. at 312. In O'Connor,the plaintiff was 56-years old and the alleged beneficiary of
the discriminatory hiring was 40 years old. See id. at 309-10. The replacement worker was a member of the ADEA's protected class, but that did not mean that plaintiff had failed to make a prima
facie case. See id. at 312.
63. See Diaz v. American Tel. & Tel., 752 F.2d 1356, 1361 (9th Cir. 1985) ("establishing a
primafacieis not designed to be onerous"). The plaintiff only needs to produce evidence that suggests that the employment action was done for discriminatory reasons. See id.
64. See, e.g., United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Govs. v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 716 (1983)
(commenting that "[t]here will seldom be 'eyewitness' testimony as to the employer's mental
processes.").
65. See Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 n.7 (1981)
(producing enough evidence to permit inference of discrimination is plaintiff's burden).
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the defendant." A rebuttable presumption is created that the employer's
actions were not allowable, unless the employer can show that they
were taken for legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons. 6'
If the defendant successfully rebuts the presumption that its actions
were been discriminatory, the third branch of McDonnell Douglas ap-6
plies and the burden of production is shifted back to the plaintiff.
Originally, if the plaintiff could show that the explanations offered by
the defendant were merely "pretextual," then plaintiff was entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. 69 Showing that the defendant's explanations were a mere "pretext" did not mean that the plaintiff must show
that the actual reasons were discriminatory, only that the reasons offered by the defendant were not genuinely responsible for the decision."
This holding was changed by the Supreme Court's decision in St.
Mary's Honor Centerv. Hicks.7'
B. St. Mary's Honor Centerv. Hicks: "PretextPlus"
In St. Mary's Honor Centerv. Hicks, the Supreme Court decided it
was not enough for the plaintiff to show that the defendant's offered
explanations were "pretextual." Plaintiff had to offer proof that the actual motive was discriminatory 2 and that "but for" the discriminatory
actions
taken by the employer, the employee would not have been laid
73
off.
In Hicks, a black employee was fired from his job at a halfway
house and the proffered reason was his violation of institutional rules. 74
More serious rule violations by other employees, however, had been ignored.' The Eighth Circuit ruled that it was enough for plaintiff to show
that the reason proffered by the defendant was not the real reason; the

66. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
67. See id.

68. See id.
69. See Hicks v. St. Mary's Honor Ctr., 970 F.2d 487, 492 (8th Cir. 1992) (finding that
"once plaintiff proved all of defendant's proffered reasons for the adverse employment actions to
be pretextual, plaintiff was entitled to judgment as a matter of law"). The Supreme Court overturned the Eighth Circuit in St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511 (1993) (holding
that plaintiff was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law).
70. See Hicks, 970 F.2d at 492.
71. 509 U.S. 502 (1993); see infra notes 72-79 and accompanying discussion.
72. See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 507.
73. See id. at 508.
74. See Hicks v. St. Mary's Honor Ctr., 756 F. Supp. 1244, 1250 (1991).
75. See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 508.
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defendant's rebuttal failed and plaintiff was given verdict as a matter of
law.76 The Supreme Court, however, ruled that even where the plaintiff
has shown that the defendant's explanation was a mere pretext, the
plaintiff must still show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that discrimination was the actual reason the plaintiff was fired.77
As Justice Souter pointed out in his dissent, the Supreme Court
majority in Hicks "adopt[ed] a scheme... unfair to plaintiffs, unworkable in practice, and inexplicable in forgiving employers who present
false evidence in court."7 Requiring this "pretext plus" has made the
plaintiffs' case under ADEA particularly difficult because the "actual"
reason may be discriminatory, but at the same time highly entangled
with non-discriminatory reasons. Making the case for plaintiffs was also
made more difficult, however, by another Supreme Court decision made
the same year - Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins.79
C. Hazen PaperCo. v. Biggins: Permitting Close Proxy to Age
In Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, a company fired a sixty-two year
old employee who was just a few weeks away from vesting in the company's pension plan." The company pension plan required employees to
have ten years of experience with the company before the plan would
vest.8' A unanimous Court ruled that since the pension plan vested for
all employees with sufficient experience, not age, there was nothing in
the company's behavior that was actionable under the ADEA. 2 The
Court reasoned that "[b]ecause age and years of service are analytically
distinct, an employer can take account of one while ignoring the other,
and thus it is incorrect to say that a decision based on years of service is
necessarily age-based."83

76. See Hicks, 970 F.2d at 492.
77. See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 511.
78. Id. at 533.
79. 507 U.S. 604 (1993).
80. See Hazen, 507 U.S. at 607.
81. See id.
82. See id. at 611. The Court decided that firing the employee to prevent pension plan from
vesting was actionable, however, under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA).
See id. at 612.
83. Hazen, 507 U.S. at 611 (emphasis added).
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To summarize, after Hicks and Hazen, an ADEA plaintiff must
make a prima facie case for discrimination. This prima facie case creates a rebuttable presumption that the defendant acted in an illegal manner.' If the employer offers a legitimate reason for its actions and the
plaintiff can prove that the employer's legitimate reason could not have
been the genuine reason, the burden of production, nevertheless, shifts
back to the plaintiff."5 For example, if the employer says that plaintiff
was laid off to save costs, cost-saving will be a legitimate reason. After
Hazen, though, even if the plaintiff can show she has been replaced by a
younger employee who earns ninety-nine percent of the plaintiff's old
salary, the employer has still shifted the burden of production back to
the plaintiff. The strong circumstantial evidence that defendant was doing more than cutting costs will not stop the burden of production from
being shifted back to plaintiff. The plaintiff must then dig deeper for the
real reason for the lay-off and show that "but for" discrimination, he
would not have been fired.86 Plaintiff's burden is especially hard since
pay level and age will probably have a strong correlation. Even without
direct evidence of the employer's mindset, the plaintiff must separate
out the effect of the two variables (pay level and age) and show that age
was a "but for" cause.n The end result is that Hazen has restricted the
"range of circumstantial evidence upon which a factfinder can draw the
inference of discrimination." 88
IV. O'CONNOR V. CONSOLIDATED COIN CATERERS CORP. AND THE
PLAniFs' PRIMA FAaE CASE

In the midst of all of these Supreme Court cases (Hicks, Hazen,
etc.) that have made the plaintiffs' task more difficult, many felt that
O'Connoroffered plaintiffs some relief. By ruling that the plaintiff does
not have to show replacement by someone too young to be protected by
the ADEA,s9 O'Connorexpanded the number of situations in which the
ADEA will apply. That was much of the holding was clearly helpful for

84. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
85. See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 507. The burden of persuasion always remains with the plaintiff.

See id.
86. See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 508.
87. See id.
88. Michael J. Zimmer, The Emerging Uniform Structure of DisparateTreatment Discrimination Litigation, 30 GA. L. REv. 563, 572 (1996). Plaintiffs will usually be relying on circumstantial evidence because of the absence of "smoking guns." See supranote 64.
89. See O'Connor,517 U.S. at 312.
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plaintiffs. It also followed common sense: If a forty-nine year old plaintiff is replaced by a thirty-nine year old, why should that ten-year gap be
any less meaningful than the ten-year gap between a fifty-year old
plaintiff replaced by a forty-year old?"° The ten year gap should be
equally probative in both cases. With the O'Connorruling, the Supreme
Court emphasized that the important protection offered by the ADEA
was given to individuals who were discriminated against because of
their age individually, not to a particular age group (i.e., those over
forty). 9' Although the Court does not state it explicitly, it follows from

the logic of O'Connor that plaintiffs may "subgroup" when making
their case. 92 The issue of subgrouping was raised in the period before
O'Connorin the case of Lowe v. Commack School District.93 This case
is examined in greater depth to illustrate why subgrouping could be

controversial.
A. Subgrouping Older Workers in Lowe v. Commack School District
The issue of subgrouping was raised in the period before
O'Connor.94 The United States Circuit Courts were divided over
whether the practice of subgrouping should be allowed, but a substantial

number were in favor of it.95 The Second Circuit decision in Lowe v.
Commack School District is a good example of this and was later cited

90. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs.,118 S. Ct. 998, 1001 (1998). (holding that
sexual harassment laws make it illegal for a member of one sex to sexually harass another person
of the same sex). The logic used in this case parallels the thinking in O'Connorbecause both cases
ignore the category or status in which the perpetrator of harassment (in Oncale) or beneficiary of
discrimination (in O'Connor)belong to. See id. at 1001-02."[Nothing in Title VII necessarily bars
a claim of discrimination 'because of... sex' merely because the plaintiff and the defendant ... are of the same sex." Id. "The fact that one person in the protected class has lost out to
another person in the protected class is thus irrelevant, so long as he has lost out because of his
age." O'Connor,517 U.S. at 312.
91. See O'Connor,517 U.S. at312.
92. "Subgrouping" is the way this practice was described in the case of Lowe v. Commack
Sch. Dist., 886 F.2d 1364, 1373 (2d Cir. 1989).
93. 886 F.2d 1364 (2d Cir. 1989) (allowing subgrouping under theory of disparate treatment).
94. See Lowe; 886 F.2d at 1364; see also Goldstein v. Manhattan Indus., Inc., 758 F.2d 1435
(allowing subgrouping under theory of disparate treatment); Douglas v. Anderson, 656 F.2d 528
(9th Cir. 1981) (allowing subgrouping under theory of disparate treatment); McCorstin v. United
States Steel Corp., 621 F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 1980) (allowing subgrouping under theory of disparate
treatment). But cf. Graffam v. Scott Paper, 60 F.3d 809 (1995) (allowing subgrouping under both
theories of disparate impact and disparate treatment).
95. See supranote 94.
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by other circuits as well.9 6 In Lowe, the Second Circuit allowed employees to make a circumstantial case for disparate treatment by comparing
job applicants fifty and older to applicants who were younger.' The
Second Circuit's concerns in Lowe should be looked at in more detail.
In Lowe, a pair of part-time, substitute teachers tried to have their
status upgraded to full-time, regular teachers."3 When they failed to do
so, they sued their school district over the method that it had used to
determine whom it would promote. 9 The plaintiffs' case relied on both
disparate treatment and disparate impact theories.re At the time they
applied for an upgrade in their job status, both plaintiffs were in their
early fifties and both claimed that the District's hiring practices were
age discriminatory.' ° However, because many of the teachers who were
actually promoted were in their forties, the plaintiffs did not allege that
the district discriminated against the entire class of people protected by
the ADEA, only those over fifty. ir
The Second Circuit decided that under a disparate impact theory,
plaintiffs should only be allowed to show that an employment practice
had that negative impact on the "class" explicitly protected by the
ADEA - those forty and over."° Because they did not do this, the
plaintiffs failed to make their prima facie case.' The Second Circuit
said that "[u]nder [the plaintiffs'] approach... any plaintiff can take his
or her own age as the lower end of a 'sub-protected group' and argue
that said 'sub-group' was disparately impacted."'' 5 The Second Circuit
left subgrouping available as a strategy for future plaintiffs who might
want to claim disparate treatment.1 6 Since Lowe, there have been other
96. See, e.g., Criley v. Delta Air Lines, Inc. 119 F.3d 102, 105 (2d Cir. 1997); EEOC v.
McDonnell Douglas, 969 F.Supp. 1221, 1223 (E.D. Mo. 1997).
97. See Lowe, 886 F.2d at 1372.
98. See id at 1366.
99. See id. at 1368.
100. See id. at 1370. The two theories do not exclude one another. See id.
101. See Lowe, 886 F.2d at 1367-69. These practices consisted of written tests and interviews.
See id. at 1367.
102. See id. at 1372. The plaintiffs alleged that older applicants with strong performances on
the written tests and interviews were rejected, while younger applicants with poorer scores were
given promotions. See id. at 1368-69.
103. See id. at 1373.
104. See Lowe, 886 F.2d at 1374.
105. Id. at 1373.
106. See id. at 1374. "We reiterate that nothing we say here should be taken to preclude a
plaintiff from prevailing on a disparate treatment claim where the 'beneficiaries' of the discriniination, although younger than the plaintiff, are nevertheless themselves within the protected group
of those 40 and over." Id. The plaintiffs in Lowe only failed under a disparate treatment theory
because their evidence was insufficient. See id. at 1377.
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courts which have ruled out disparate impact cases as well, and some of
them have expressed the same reservations about subgrouping as the
Second Circuit did in Lowe.1°7
Judge Pierce, who wrote the concurring opinion in Lowe, made a
practical argument, however, for also allowing ADEA plaintiffs to make
their claims under a theory of disparate impact.0 3 Judge Pierce argued
that
the likely beneficiary of discrimination against a 60-year old person
will be another member of the protected group, i.e., a person more
than 40 years of age. Thus, "[i]f no intra-age group protection were
provided by the ADEA, it would be of virtually no use to persons in
the upper ages of the protected class whose jobs require experience
since even an employer with clear anti-age animus would rarely replace them with someone under 40."'°9
The ADEA expressly protects individuals against age discrimination
[cites omitted] ...Nothing in the statute suggests that when a member

of the protected class is discriminated against on the basis of age, the
extent of that individual member's rights should be contingent upon
the age of the person who has benefited from that discrimination. The
majority opinion, however, would raise this fortuity to the level of a
dispositive factor in those instances where disparate treatment cannot
be shown... In my view, such a refusal goes against the 'thrust' of
Congress'0 intent, as the Supreme Court discerned that intent in
Griggs.

The Supreme Court in O'Connor shared some of the same concerns as Judge Pierce, but did not go so far as endorsing disparate impact in ADEA cases. They did allow for subgrouping, however, to help
make the case under a theory of disparate treatment.
107. See, e.g., Barnes v. Gencorp, Inc., 896 F.2d 1457, 1467 (6th Cir. 1990).
108. See Lowe, 886 F.2d at 1379-80.
109. Id. at 1379 (quoting Maxfield v. Sinclair Int'l, 766 F.2d 788, 792 (3d Cir. 1985)).
110. Id. at 1379-80. Judge Pierce cited several court cases which upheld subgroup protection
under disparate treatment and argued that the same reasoning should be applied to subgrouping
under disparate impact. See id. at 1380. Among the cases cited were Goldstein v. Manhattan Indus., Inc., 758 F.2d 1435 (11th Cir. 1985); McCorstin v. United States Steel Corp., 621 F.2d 749
(5th Cir. 1980). Disparate impact subgrouping was defended in Graffam v. Scott Paper Co., 848 F.
Supp. 1 (D.Me.), aff'd, 60 F.3d 809 (lst Cir. 1995); Finch v. Hercules, Inc., 865 F. Supp. 1104 (D.
Del. 1994). For a full argument in favor of disparate impact, see Jonas Saunders, Age Discrimination: DisparateImpact Under the ADEA After Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins: Arguments in Favor,
73 U. DET. MERCYL.REv. 591 (1996).
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B. The Effect of O'Connorv. ConsolidatedCoin CaterersCorp. on
Subgrouping
In O'Connor,when a fifty-six year old sales manager was fired and
replaced by a forty-year old, he brought an ADEA case against his employer. The sales manager's employer, Consolidated Coin, did not dispute plaintiff O'Connor's use of the McDonnell Douglas scheme described above.' The only issue that the Court decided in O'Connorwas
whether or not the plaintiff made his prima facie case despite failing to
allege that he was replaced by a person who was a non-member of the
protected class." 2 The Court decided that the ADEA was not set up to
protect people in one "age class" from discriminatory treatment which
benefits another outside that class. "The fact that one person in the protected class has lost out to another person outside the protected class is
thus irrelevant, so long as he lost out because of his age.""' But the
Court noted that the ADEA did limit this "age protection" (not "class
protection") to people forty and over who have been ' discriminated
4
against in favor of someone "not insubstantially younger."
C. What Does O'ConnorMean by "SubstantiallyYounger"?
In its O'Connordecision, the Supreme Court ruled that intra-group
comparisons could be made between members who were close in age,
but that as a practical matter the prima facie case would require evidence that the replacement worker was "not ... insignificantly younger"
than the plaintiff for it to carry any weight." 5 That raises the question of
what "significantly younger" means. The Supreme Court is not specific
but does offer hints. The plaintiff in O'Connor was sixteen years older
than his replacement. 1 6 That sixteen-year discrepancy was enough for
the plaintiff's prima facie case, but the Court does not suggest that the
gap must be that large."7

111. See O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 307, 309 (1997). The Supreme Court noted that they had never explicitly ruled that McDonnell Douglas could be applied
to ADEA cases but left the issue unresolved for now. See id.
112. Seeid.at312.
113. See id.
114. See id. at 313.
115. See O'Connor,517 U.S. at 312.

116. See id.
117. See id.
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Other examples of "significant" age differences can be found in
pre- and post-O'ConnorADEA cases. In 1981, the Ninth Circuit ruled
in Douglas v. Anderson"' that a five-year gap was enough to help make
a prima facie case when a fifty-four year old worker was discharged and
replaced by a forty-nine year old."9 Meanwhile, the Third Circuit and
the D.C. Circuit split over whether eight years was enough of a difference, with the Third Circuit saying that it was in Barber v. CSX Distribution Services,' and the D.C. Circuit saying it was not in Adkins v.
Safeway, Inc.121 The court in Barbersaid "[t]here is no magical formula
to measure a particular age gap and determine if it is sufficiently wide to
give rise to an inference of discrimination, however, case law assists our
inquiry."' It cited the earlier case of Healy v. New York Life Insurance
Co." in which nine years was considered enough to make the prima facie case even though the benefited employee was also over forty." A
New York district court ruled that twelve years was "substantially
younger' in McNulty v. New York City Department of Finance." However, the Eighth Circuit ruled that five years younger was not substan26 In Hartley
tially younger in Schiltz v. Burlington Northern Railroad.1
2
7
v. Wisconsin Bell,' the Seventh Circuit decided that a ten-year difference in ages was "substantial" under O'Connor and that six or seven
years might not be enough depending on the rest of the evidence.',
There have also been a few unusual rulings in which the courts
have allowed (or said that they would allow) prima facie evidence
showing that plaintiff was younger than the person supposedly benefiting from the discriminatory conduct. The Tenth Circuit has in fact done
this in Greene v. Safeway Stores 9 and the Ninth Circuit has said that it
would in dicta in the Douglas case.3 These courts may not be trying to
118. 656 F.2d 528 (9th Cir. 1981).
119. See Douglas, 656 F.2d at 533.
120. 68 F.3d 694, 699 (3d Cir. 1995).
121. 985 F.2d 1101, 1104 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
122. Barber,68 F.3d at 699.
123. 860 F.2d 1209 (3d Cir. 1988); Barber, 68 F.3d at 699.
124. See Healy, 860 F.2d at 1214.
125. 941 F. Supp. 452,457 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
126. 115 F.3d 1407, 1413 (8th Cir. 1997).
127. 124 F.3d 887 (7th Cir. 1997).
128. See Hartley, 124 F.3d at 893.
129. 98 F.3d 554, 557 (10th Cir. 1996) (reversing a grant of summary judgment to defendant
even though the replacement worker was five years older than the plaintiff).
130. See Douglas, 656 F.2d at 533;Loeb v. Textron, 600 F.2d 1003, 1013 n.9 (1st Cir. 1979).
"Replacement by someone older would suggest no age discrimination but would not disprove it
conclusively. The older replacement could have been hired, for example, to ward off a threatened
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lay the groundwork for allowing reverse discrimination under the
ADEA. It is more likely that they want plaintiffs to be able to counter
the strategic rehiring of laid-off employees. 3'
This Note will now set up a hypothetical "downsizing" situation.
This hypothetical will allow us to look at how subgroup analysis can affect the statistics used to make the plaintiff's prima facie case. The hypothetical will also examine how the "substantially younger" requirement in O'Connor could affect the plaintiff's statistical case by
requiring data to be omitted from the analysis.
V. A "DOwNSIZING" HYPOTHETCAL: How O'CONNOR AFFECTS THE
NUMBERS IN AN AGE DISCRIMINATION CASE

Say that a large company, the Downsize Corporation, has announced that due to economic pressures, it will be forced to shrink its
workforce. Imagine that the layoff will affect many thousands of people,
but that within the company there is a group of 100 employees who
share the same job category. They have the same responsibilities, duties,
and work hours. In addition, they are paid roughly the same amount of
money and have comparable amounts of experience and skills. They
range in age from thirty-five to fifty-five and are evenly spread out
across this range. Suppose that the layoffs produce the results shown in
Table IA. Afterwards, a group of plaintiffs bring an ADEA suit under a
joint theory of disparate impact and disparate treatment. They use statistics to present circumstantial evidence that they have been discriminated against.

discrimination suit." Id.
131. See Loeb, 600 F.2d at 1013 n.9.
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TABLE IA. Layoffs experienced by Downsize Corporation's employees who fall within the same job category and have the same level
of skill, salary, and experience.
Employee Age
Bands32

Number of
Employees in
Age Band

Number of
Employees
Fired

35-40
40-45
45-50
50-55

25
25
25
25

2
2
6
10

Number of
Employees
Still
Employed
23
23
19
15

A. O'ConnorJustifies the Subgrouping of Plaintiffs
Statistics can test these numbers and see if there was a connection
between the employees' ages and whether or not they lost their job. In
statistical language, a statistical test should look to see if the employees'
age and job status were treated as "independent variables."'33 If the two
variables are independent of each other, then the odds of the employee
falling into a particular age category had no effect on the employees'
odds of being fired or retained.
A chi-square test can be used to test the independence of the two
variables for all of the employees." The chi-square takes advantage of a
law from the field of probability. If two variables, such as age and job
status, are independent, then the odds that an employee is in a particular

132. In order to sort the employees by age, some lines need to be drawn. For the puppies of
these tables, an employee who is exactly 40 is the 35-40 category, but someone who is 40 years
and a day goes is in the 40-45 category.
133. The employees in Table IA can be categorized according to two different variables - age
and job status. Each employee has a "job variable" (fired or not fired) and an "age variable" (3540, 40-45, 45-50, or 50-55).
134. See HENRY GARRETr, ELEMENTARY STATISTICS 139 (van Rees Press, New York, 1962)
(giving an explanation of the chi-square statistic); Michael Piette and Douglas Sauer, Legal and
Statistical Approaches to Analyzing Allegations of Employment Discrimination, 3 J. LEGAL ECON.
1 (1993). "A common first [test] in establishing a prima facie case is to use the chi-square statistic
to compare two or more distributions." Id. at 6; Richard Singleton, Use of Statistics in Age Discrimination Litigation, 371 P.L.I. LIT. 177 (1989). "The first step in a statistical analysis of a layoff generally will be to perform a two-by-two chi-square analysis, comparing numbers of employees under and over age forty laid off and not laid off.... If the result is statistically significant, the
possibility of age discrimination is raised." Id. at 184.
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age group and a particular job category is simple to calculate - simply
multiply the odds of each outcome occurring by itself.
For example, suppose that the Downsize Corp. acted legally and
that age had no effect influence on whether an employee was fired. Statistically this would mean that the two variables of age and job status
were independent of each other. It would also mean that the odds of an
employee belonging to a particular age group and a particular job category could be calculated by multiplying the odds of those things happening separately. Suppose that plaintiffs' counsel wants to know the
odds of a Downsize Corp. employee being laid-off and being between
the ages of thirty-five and forty. Table IA shows that the odds of being
laid-off for all employees were 20/100.' The odds of an employee being between thirty-five and forty-years of age were 25/100.36 Take the
odds of being fired, multiply by the odds of being thirty-five to forty,
and the result is the odds of being both: 1/20. There were 100 people in
the original workforce. Since the odds are that one out of twenty will be
"fired" and "thirty-five to forty," there should be five people in that
category. Similar calculations can be done for all eight of the categories." 7 Table 1IB shows the same information as Table IA, but with the
expected values for each cell placed in parentheses next to the number
which was actually observed.
TABLE ]IB. Employees fired and employees retained. The expected number of employees in each category is placed in parentheses
next to the actual number of employees who were in that category.
Employee Age
Bands

Number of
Employees in
Age Band

Number of
Employees
Fired

35-40
40-45
45-50

25
25
25

2 (5)
2 (5)
6 (5)

Number of
Employees
Still
Employed
23 (20)
23 (20)
19 (20)

50-55

25

10 (5)

15 (20)

135. These are the odds because 20% of the workforce lost its job.
136. These are the odds because 25% of the workforce is in that age category.
137. There are eight categories in this hypothetical because there are four age groups and two
job outcomes.
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In this case, the number of employees laid off in the younger age
groups is less than expected and the number laid off in the older categories is more than expected to see. It looks like the two variables were

not independent of each other and that employees who were older were
more likely to lose their jobs. This appearance, however, is subjective.
A statistical test such as the chi-square can provide more objective
evidence that the two variables are not independent of each other. The
test does this by comparing results such as the ones seen in Table IB to
all of the theoretical outcomes that could happen at random when the
two variables are independent. If the odds of seeing results like those
above will very rarely happen when the variables are independent, then
courts may draw the inference that the Downsize Corp. acted illegally. 3 '
The chi-square statistic is calculated by taking the difference between the expected number for a cell and the actual number observed,
squaring the difference, dividing what was expected for that cell and
adding the results for all of the cells.'39 In this case, the chi-square statistic is equal to 11.0.24° This value is compared to all possible values
that might arise when layoff decisions are not affected by age. 14' In this
case, a table of chi-square statistics shows that the odds of seeing the
Table lB pattern of layoffs when the variables are independent are between 1 in 20 and 1 in 100.142 If it was that unlikely to see the Table IB
138. See ,VAYNE C. CURTIS, STATISTICAL CONCEPTS FOR ATTORNEYS: A REFERENCE GUIDE
144-51 (1983) (providing another example of the use of chi-square to test the independence of two
variables).
139. See id. at 142.
140. The chi-square statistic for Tables IB is (2 - 5)215 + (2 - 5)2/5 + (6 - 5)2/5 +
(10 - 5)2/5 + (23 - 20)2/20 + (23 - 20)2/20 + (19 - 20)2/20 + (15 - 20)2/20 = 1.8 + 1.8 + 0.2 + 5.0 +
0.45 + 0.45 + 0.05 + 1.25 = 11.0.
141. The most unususal outcomes that will occur at random have large differences between
the numbers that are observed and the numbers that are expected. Because the chi-square statistic
is calculated by taking the difference of these two numbers, see CURTIS, supra note 138, at 142,
unlikely outcomes will generate large chi-square statistics.
142. The chi-square statistic that is generated here has to be compared to a chi-square number
in a theoretical distribution. This distribution has a different shape depending on the "degrees of
freedom" of the distribution. See GARRErT, supra note 134, at 142. The degrees of freedom ("df')
is the number of age categories minus one (a - 1) times the number of employment categories minus one (e - 1). See id. In Table IB, for example, df = (a - 1) X (e - 1) = 3 X 1 = 3. For a chisquare distribution with three degrees of freedom, there is a 5% chance that the chi-square statistic
will be above 7.81 and a 1% chance that it will be above 11.34. See CURTIS, supra note 138, at
221. Since the chi-square statistic we calculated is 11.0, the probability of seeing the Table TB outcome if age and employment are unrelated is between 1% and 5%. See id. There is no specific
level of probability that the courts require in order to decide that there has been discrimination, but
a 5% level has been used frequently. See Richard Mariani & Kimberly Robertson, Age Discrimination Litigation:RIFs,Statistics and Stray Remarks, 64 DEF. COUNS. J.88, 92 (1997).
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outcome when the Downsize Corp. acted fairly, then that should allow a
court to draw an inference that the company behaved illegally. The in-

ference should be strong enough for plaintiffs to make a prima facie
case. The categories in Table IB which were disproportionately affected
are obvious. There are an increasing number of layoffs for the older
categories and the trend is "one-way."
Now look at what a pre-O'Connorcourt might have forced plaintiffs to do when making their case. Table II combines the downsizings
from Tables IB into only two age categories: for employees under forty
and those forty and over.

TABLE II. Comparing employees under forty to employees forty
and over. The expected value for each category is in parentheses.

Employee Age
Bands

Number of
Employees in
Age Band

Number of
Employees
Fired

Number of Employees Still
Employed

under 40143

25

2 (5)

23 (20)

40 and over

75

18(15)

57 (60)

The chi-square statistic must be slightly altered when dealing with
a 2X2 contingency table, but it will still work.'" In this case the chisquare statistic will be 2.08141 which is not significant at even the p =

[T]he precise level of statistical significance required for a statistical disparity to give
rise to an inference of intentional discrimination has not been settled. The U.S. Supreme Court has suggested that when the analysis of large samples shows statistical
disparities that exceed two or three standard deviations, the disparities generally would
be deemed to be significant. However, the Court made it clear that it did not intend to
suggest "that precise calculations of statistical significance are necessary in employing
statistical proof."
Id. (citing Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 308 n.14, 311 n.17 (1977)). "Two
standard deviations" means that there is an approximately 5% chance of the observed statistic occurring at random. See id.
143. This is really the 35-40 band from Table 1B. The hypothetical assumes that there are no
employees under 35 in this job category.
144. See GARRETT, supra note 134, at 145. The 2X2 refers to the fact that there are two possible job outcomes and two possible age classifications: "fired"/ "still employed" and "<40 / 40+."
The statistic must now be calculated from a chi-square distribution which only has 1 degree of
freedom (df= 1). See id. at 146.
145. With only two age categories, the chi-square statistic must use a "Yates correction fac-
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0.05 level.'46 That means that if a pre-O'Connorcourt refused to allow
plaintiffs from looking at members of the over-forty group as different

from each other, plaintiffs might not be able to make a prima facie case
using statistics.
Now look at what might happens when courts accept subgrouping.
The plaintiffs won't have to draw a line between employees under forty
and those who are forty and over. If the plaintiffs think that the company's discriminatory treatment only affects employees who are fortyfive and older, then they will be free to run a test which looks at the in-

dependence of the age categories of "35-45" / "45+" and the employment category "fired" I "still employed." This result is shown in Table

III.
TABLE III. Comparing employees under forty-five to those who
are forty-five and over. The expected value for each category is in parentheses.
Employee Age
Bands

Number of
Employees in
Age Band

Number of
Employees
Fired

under 45

50

4 (10)

Number of
Employees
Still
Employed
46 (40)

45 and over

50

16 (10)

34 (40)

The chi-statistic here is 7.56 which is very significant. It is a strong

indication that the company has engaged in discrimination because there
is a less than a one percent chance that such an outcome would happen

if the company acted in an age-neutral way. 47 Table IV looks at the retor." See CURTIs, supra note 138, at 146. To calculate the chi-square statistic with a Yates correction factor, subtract 0.5 from the absolute value of the difference between the expected and observed values of a cell. See id. The result is squared and divided by the expected value. See id. For
the four categories shown in Table III this would result in the following: For age band 35-40 /
"fired": 12 - 5 I= 3 (absolute value of -3 is 3). (3 - 0.5) = 2.5. (2.5)2,5 = 1.25. For age band 40+ /
"fired": 118 - 15 1= 3. (3 - 0.5) = 2.5. (2.5)2/15 = 0.42. For age band 35-40 / "still employed": 123
- 20 1= 3. (3 - 0.5) = 2.5. (2.5)2/20 = 0.31. For age band 40+ / "still employed": 157 - 60 I= 3. (3 0.5) = 2.5. (2.5)2/60 = 0.1. So the chi-square statistic for Table III is 1.25 + 0.412 + 0.31 + 0.1 =
2.08.
146. This means that if the downsized jobs were picked at random from the two age categories, there is a more than a 5% chance that the results would be this lopsided. If there is more than
a 5% percent chance of a law-abiding company creating this outcome, courts might be reluctant to
infer that a prima facie case for discrimination has been made unless other circumstantial evidence
is given. See Mariani & Robertson, supranote 142, at 92.
147. For a chi-square distribution with df = 1, there is a 5% chance of such an outcome if the
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sults of a chi-square test when the age cutoff is moved to the fifty-year
mark.
TABLE IV. Comparing employees under fifty to employees fifty
and over. The expected value for each category is in parentheses.
Employee Age
Bands

Number of
Employees in
Age Band

Number of
Employees
Fired

under 50
50 and over

75
25

10(15)
10 (5)

Number of
Employees
Still
Employed
65 (60)
15 (20)

The chi-statistic here is 6.75. There was a slightly less than one
percent chance of this happening if the two age categories were independent of the decisions made to fire people.'
B. The "Substantially Younger" Requirement and Omitted Data
What would happen if courts, following the O'Connor decision,
decide that "substantially younger" means that there must be a five-year
gap between the plaintiffs' subgroup and the group that allegedly
benefited from this discrimination?'49 The language of the O'Connor
decision could mean that plaintiff employees could only be compared
statistically to employees who are at least five years younger. In that
case the courts might require data to be omitted from the analysis. They
might expect the plaintiff to make his prima facie case without including the treatment (whether good or bad) given to other employees who
are close to the plaintiff in age.
In Table V, the hypothetical assumes that plaintiffs are all fortyfive and older. If they allege that employees under forty-five have been

statistic is as high as 3.84 and a 1% chance of such an outcome if the statistic is 6.64. Since the
value here is even higher, the odds are less than 1%. See CURTIs, supra note 138, at 221.
148. There is only 1 degree of freedom here as in Table III. For I degree of freedom, chisquare = 3.84 at the 5% level and chi-square = 6.64 at the 1% level. See CURTIS, supra note 138,
at 221.
149. See e-mail correspondence between the author and Allan G. King, J.D, PhD. (on file
with the Hofstra Labor & Employment Law Journal).Dr. King is an attorney with Littler Mendelson, 2001 Ross. Ave., Dallas, TX 75201 (e-mail: AGKing@littler.com). The author would like to
thank Dr. King for his help in explaining some of the statistical implications of the O'Connor decision.
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given beneficial treatment, the courts might want information on the
forty to forty-five year old employees omitted.

TABLE V. Comparison done with a five year gap. Comparing
employees thirty-five to forty with those who are forty-five and over.
The expected value for each category is in parentheses.
Employee Age
Bands

Number of
Employees in
Age Band

Number of
Employees
Fired

35-40

25

2 (5)

Number of
Employees
Still
Employed
23 (20)

45-55

50

16 (10)

34 (40)

The chi-square statistic here is 5.34 which is statistically significant. It is less significant than the comparisons done in Tables III and
IV, however. This is not surprising, though, because something which
reduces the number of observations will usually reduce the chance of
getting significant results. 50 In fact, it is a well-known defense strategy
to break down the data into as many categories as possible so that significant results become less likely. 5' In the case of Table V, the omitted

data which were omitted included the below-average number of layoffs
for the forty to forty-five year olds. 5 ' For a one-way pattern of numbers
150. But see Csicseri v. Bowsher, 862 F. Supp. 547, 564 (D.D.C. 1994) (giving more weight
to defendant's complete evidence when plaintiff's expert omitted data from below plaintiffs' age
group without adequate explanation). "Instead of performing an analysis for those under 50 versus
those over 50, the age bracket in which plaintiffs allege that discrimination lies, [plaintiffs' expert]
ran an analysis of those under 40 versus those over 50." Id.
151. See, e.g., Kent Spriggs, ProbativeValue of StatisticalProof,in EMPLOYMENT LAW: THE
BIG CASE 524, ALI-ABA Course of Study (1996). 'Defendants are mindful of the statistical implications of small sample size.... In the extreme case, the disaggregation is so severe that no significance could be found regardless of what the defendants' behavior is.... These defense tactics
are well-known to the courts." Id. at 524; Capaci v. Katz & Besthoff, Inc., 711 F.2d 647, 654 (5th
Cir. 1983). "[The defendant] attempted.., an unfair and obvious attempt to disaggregate [the]
data to the point where it was difficult to demonstrate statistical significance." Id. at 654. To understand why increasing the categories makes it less likely to find significance, imagine that the
layoff data in our example was broken down into age bands so small that each one contained just
two employees. Then the number of employees in that band who actually got fired would either be
zero, one or two. Since the expected number of firings would also be between zero and two, the
two numbers could not be very far apart even if the employer had a strong discriminatory bias. But
larger disparities between observed and expected values create larger chi-square statistics, see supra note 140, and larger chi-square statistics lead to stronger inferences of discrimination, see supra note 141. Smaller age bands do not allow this to happen. See Capaci, 711 F.2d at 654.
152. See supra Table IB. Five layoffs were expected for this age group, but only two were
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as was originally shown in Table IA, using the full range of data will
probably help the plaintiffs.
Table VI runs an analysis which compares employees in the fifty to
fifty-five year range and omits the data for employees forty-five to fifty.
TABLE VI. Comparisons done with a five-year gap. Comparing
employees thirty-five to forty-five with employees who are fifty to fiftyfive. The expected value for each category is in parentheses.
Employee Age
Bands

Number of
Employees in
Age Band

Number of
Employees
Fired

35-45
50-55

50
25

4 (10)
10 (5)

Number of
Employees
Still
Employed
46 (40)
15 (20)

The chi-square statistic in Table VI jumps to 8.39 - highly significant153 but still less significant than when all the data were used in
Table IB.
Now look at what happens when all of the chi-square statistics are
compared in one chart, listed from greatest significance on top
(strongest case for plaintiff) to least significance on bottom (strongest
case for defendant). The first column describes the data comparison
which created the statistic.

observed. See id.
153. The odds of this occurring by chance are much less than 1 out of 100. In statistical language, this is written asp << 0.01.
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TABLE VII. A comparison of all the chi-square statistics generated
by the comparisons in Tables IB-VI.
Data
Compared
all four
age bands
35-45 vs. 50-55
< 45 vs. 45 +
< 50 vs. 50 +
35-40 vs. 45-55
< 40 vs. 40 +

df
3
1
1.
1
1
1

Chi-square Significance
Statistic
Level
11.0
01 <p <.05
8.39
7.56
6.75
5.34
2.08

p << .0114
p <.01
p =.01
.01 <p < .05
( not signif. )

Original
Table
IB
VI

II
IV
V
II

The results in Table VII are essentially duplicated even when the
statistical test used to analyze the data is different. Table VIII, for example, displays the levels of significance found when the same comparisons done in Tables IB-VI are analyzed with: the Fisher's Exact
Test.5 5 Like the chi-quare test, the Fisher's Test sets up contingency tables which are 2X2 5 ' and tests to see if the two possible outcomes of the
age variable ("younger" or "older") have a different effect on the job
variable ("fired" or "not fired"). The Fisher's Test is a more powerful
test than the chi-square in this situation.' 57 As a result, all of the significance levels for the data comparisons are higher (i.e., the p values are
lower). The data comparisons are listed in order from "most significant"
at the top to "not significant" at the bottom.

154. Read this as "p is much less than .01."
155. See D. Baldus & J. Cole, STATISTICAL PROOF OF DISCRIMINATION (McGRAW HILL,
1980) (§ 9A.1l1-12); The Fisher's exact test is used when the sample pool is relatively small. See
id. In the case of Table IB, the sample pool is the collection of 100 Downsize Corp. employees
who share the same job category. See Carla Walworth & Wendy Dunne DiChristina, Masters of
the Numerical Universe: Challenging Statistics in Age DiscriminationSuits, EMPLOYMENT REL.
L.J. 37, 46 (1995) (recommending the Fisher's test for small groups).
156. There are two age categories and two job outcomes.
157. The "power" of a statistical test is the probability that it will reject the "null hypothesis"
when it is not true. The null hypothesis, in this example, is the theory that older employees have
the same chance of getting fired as younger employees. If this is not true, the Fisher's Test is more
likely to point that out. However, there is a tradeoff. More powerful test statistics are also more
likely to reject the null hypothesis when they should accept it.
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TABLE VIII. A comparison of Fisher's Exact Test statistics generated from the Table IB data. The most significant results are at the
top; the least significant are at the bottom.'58
Data Compared
< 45 vs. 45+
35-45 vs. 50-55
< 50 vs. 50 +
35-40 vs. 45-55
< 40 vs. 40 +

Level of Significance
p = 0.0025
(most signif.)
p = 0.0057
p = 0.0063
p = 0.0182
p = 0.0684
(not signif.)

OriginalTable
11
VI
IV
V
II

When the comparisons done with the Fisher's Test are listed in order of significance, the results are almost the same as the chi-square results in Table VII) 59 A listing of the different chi-square comparisons
from most significant to least significant is as follows: "35-45 vs. 5055," then "< 45 vs. 45 +," "< 50 vs. 50 +," "35-40 vs. 45-55," and finally "< 40 vs. 40 +." For the Fisher's Exact Test, the most-to-least
significant list starts with "< 45 vs. 45 +," then "35-45 vs. 50-55," "< 50
vs. 50 +," "35-40 vs. 45-55," and finally "< 40 vs. 40 +." The chi-square
and Fisher's Test produce the same result except that the first two items
are reversed.
C. A Legal Interpretationof the StatisticalResults 6
Look again at the trend shown in the third column of Table VII.' 6'
These are the results of the chi-square analysis and every comparison
that was done produced significant results except for "< 40 vs. 40 +."
Still, it is hard to imagine how these statistical results could be translated into legal inferences or conclusions when the results are looked at
as a whole. The reason for the difficulty is that the results are not

158. Note that the first two items on the list are reversed from the results done with a clhisquare statistic, but the remaining data comparisons have retained their significance ranking.
159. The Table lB comparison which included "all four age bands" should not be compared
because no analysis was done for all four age bands with the Fisher's Exact Test.
160. Since the trends for both tests were so similar, the rest of this section will concentrate on
the chi-square results in Table VII.
161. Since these Tables all involve comparisons with df = 1, they can be compared to each
other. Comparing two chi-square statistics with different degrees of freedom to each other is
meaningless, like comparing apples and oranges.
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"continuous" - they jump around. To see the discontinuity, focus on
the results (in the right-hand column of Table VI) for Tables II, I1, and
IV. These were the comparisons which did not omit any data; they just
involved different cut-off lines separating the employees. Although the
original data from Table IB showed a one-way trend (higher layoffs for
higher age groups), the results in Table VII show that the greatest inference of discrimination can be drawn when employees less than fortyfive are compared to those over forty-five (Table III). The level of significance there is p < 0.01, but falls off when the age cutoff point is either raised or lowered from there. If the cutoff is raised to age fifty the p
level rises to 0.01 (Table I). If the age cutoff is lowered to forty, the p
level becomes so high it is insignificant (Table II).
This discontinuity has nothing to do with the behavior of the
Downsizing Corp. It is a result of a quirk in the mathematics of the statistical test which can not be translated into an easy legal conclusion.
For that reason, the plaintiffs might not want to present all of these
comparisons to the trier of fact. If the plaintiff did present all of the
comparisons, what could a trier of fact conclude from them - that the
employer acted in a discriminatory way towards employees up to the
age of forty-five, but then treated employees who were even older in a
non-discriminatory way? That would not make any sense intuitively or
legally. This discontinuity shows why a charge of "data mining" can
frequently be leveled against a plaintiff who "subgroups." If the plaintiff
is free to select the separation point at any age, then he can make a selection which minimizes the p-value and maximizes significance. 6
The problem can also be seen if the "substantially younger" phrase
in O'Connorrequires plaintiff to omit data. The plaintiffs' best case in
Table VII is when the data for the forty-five to fifty year-olds are omitted (p << 0.01). These results are more significant than when the omit-

162. See RUPERT MILLER & DAVID SIEGMUND, Maximally Selected Chi-Square Statistics, 38
BIOMETRICs 1011 (1982) cited in PAETZOLD & WILLBORN, THE STATISTICS OF DISCRIMINATION

75 n.17 (Shepard's McGraw-Hill, 1985) (discussing the idea of choosing cutoff points to maximize chi-square statistics); Harriet Zellner, Age Discrimination:Revisiting the Issue of Statistical
Evidence, 5 EMPLOY. L. STRAT. 1 (1997). After setting up a hypothetical lay off situation which
has results similar to those shown in Table VII, Dr. Zellner writes:
I am aware that the [O'Connor]Court did not... say explicitly that "[it is insufficient,
in testing statistically for age discrimination, to compare the termination rate of those
over 40 as a group to the rate for those under 40; rather, we must examine the agetermination relationship along its entire over-40 range." I hope, however, that, as an
economist and applied statistician, I may be forgiven for hearing the decision in just
that way.
lId at2.
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ted employees are the forty to forty-five year-olds (0.1 <p < 0.05). But
Table IA implies that they may have been discriminated against as well.
Should the forty to forty-five year olds be excluded from bringing a
lawsuit because of the "substantially younger" requirement? Should
they be included but treated differently when legal conclusions are
drawn?
Not all of the problems are the plaintiffs. Some are faced by the
employer. Suppose that the plaintiffs are all between fifty and fifty-five
and they have found that their strongest prima facie case (p << 0.01) is
when the forty-five to fifty year olds are omitted.'63 They have made all
of the other comparisons, but see that they are not as convincing.
Through the use of attorney-client privilege, they may even keep those
results from discovery by the defendant. The company wants to counter
the plaintiffs' statistics by showing the actual changes in significance
that a different comparison would yield, not just criticizing what the
plaintiffs have done. If they have evidence that the gap helps the plaintiff by getting rid of data helpful to the defendant, should they be allowed to show a comparison without any omissions?' 4 And if the employer does that, how should the plaintiffs be allowed to counter when
they try to show "pretext plus"? Courts might want to treat
"substantially younger" as a weaker requirement depending on the facts
of the case.
VI. SOME POLICY CONCERNS IN APPLYING O'CONNOR

Although O'Connorwas decided correctly it is sure to lead to some
confusion. Because the Court only ruled what the fourth branch of
McDonnell Douglascould not be, but did not say what it must be, lower
federal courts will have to work out rules for the "substantially
younger" requirement on their own. How these rules evolve will affect
the statistical cases which are vital to ADEA "subgrouping" cases. The
mathematical example in Section IV shows how the right rules are
needed to prevent ADEA plaintiffs from losing more ground than they
have already lost under Hicks and Hazen.

163. See the results from Table VI.
164. Or imagine that the results are slightly different from Table VII and that a comparison
between the < 45 and 45 + employees give results which are less significant than the results from
Table V. Should the employer be allowed to "close the gap" and argue that allowing the gap gives
plaintiffs too much opportunity to omit bad data?
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To do this, a few simple rules should be followed by the lower
courts when applying the "substantially younger" requirement in
O'Connor:
1) The meaning of "substantially younger" should vary according
to the facts of the case, but as a rule of thumb courts should typically
expect a gap of five years between the youngest plaintiff and the oldest
beneficiary of the alleged discrimination. This is a large enough gap to
keep out frivolous claims without requiring plaintiffs to exclude so
much of their data that their cases are harmed by small sample problems.
A five-year gap will also rule out reverse discrimination claims
which violate the intent and purpose of the statute.' 6 The ADEA was
passed to prevent businesses from acting on unsubstantiated stereotypes
of older workers and allowing reverse discrimination would completely
defeat that purpose. The only time an exception should be made for this
is when the plaintiff has presented evidence that the hiring of the older
(or same-age) replacement was done as part of a "strategy" to ward off a
lawsuit after
discriminating on the basis of age against a particular individual.' 66
2) The five-year rule should be relaxed for plaintiffs who have
small-sample cases that will be barred by such a rule if those plaintiffs
can show that their non-statistical case (involving "stray remarks," discriminatory business practice, etc.) is otherwise strong. The rule should
also be relaxed for plaintiffs who can show that statistical anomalies
will pop up if they are forced to omit data, but again, this flexibility
should be dependent on plaintiffs' showing an otherwise strong case.
3) The employer should be allowed to ignore the "substantially
younger" five-year gap when he makes his case for rebuttal. If the defendant counters the prima facie case with a different age comparison
(by filling in the missing data, moving the "gap," or running a different
"over/under" comparison) the requirement of a five-year difference
should be waived for the plaintiffs as well when they try to show
"pretext plus."

165. The reasons mentioned here were given by the Seventh Circuit in Hamilton v. Caterpillar
Inc., 966 F.2d 1226, 1227 (7th Cir. 1992).
166. Criticism of this sort of "strategic" hire would only make sense if the plaintiff was
bringing a "disparate treatment" action where the discrimination was supposed to be intentional. A
plaintiff could not allege that an employer's policy was not intentional but had an illegal
"disparate impact" on one group of employees at the expense of another group that was the same
age or even younger.
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Imagine that the example given at the end of Section V is modified
slightly: the plaintiffs are all over fifty. They run several different age
comparisons and find that their strongest case is when the data for ages
forty-three to fifty are omitted. After they make their prima facie case,
should the employer be allowed to present results for a comparison of
employees under fifty and over fifty? Of course. Limiting the defendant's methodology to what the plaintiffs originally chose will give
plaintiffs too much power. If the defendant's strongest case is when the
"gap" is closed, he should be able to run that test and show the numbers
that result. 6 7 Defendant should not be limited to criticizing the plaintiffs' methodology. The defendant might even have evidence that
"business necessity" made him treat employees fifty and over differently from those "substantially younger." Then he might want to keep
the five-year gap but shift it downward.
And if the employer rebuts the plaintiffs' methodology with his
own, plaintiffs should follow up on the defendant's rebuttal with any
numerical evidence available. The plaintiffs should not be required to
show flaws in the defendant's rebuttal with the same age comparison
that they used to make their prima facie case.
These simple rules and their few exceptions will not eliminate the
difficulties faced by courts hearing ADEA cases, but they might
straighten out some of the confusion that will follow the O'Connordecision. Organizing the theory behind subgroup analysis is important because the American population is aging and faces greater job insecurity
from cost-cutting employers. There are going to be many such employers who take the decision-making "short cut" of simply firing their oldest workers to save money without considering the actual benefits.

167. See Carla Walworth & Wendy DiChristina, Master of the Numerical Universe: Challenging Statistics in Age DiscriminationSuits, 21 EMPLOYMENT REL L.J. 37 (1996) for a discussion of the defendants' tactics in light of possible statistical quirks. "[PIlaintiff may proffer statistical evidence supporting an inference that an employer discriminated against workers over 50 years
of age. If, however, the employer can establish that workers 55 years of age and older are not discriminated against, then the plaintiff's statistical evidence could be merely an arbitrary anomaly
Id. at44.
.....

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol16/iss1/7

32

Schaub: The "Substantially Younger" Requirement in O'Conner v. Consolidat
1998]

Will ADEA PlaintiffsLose Again?

As Judge Pierce pointed out in his concurring decision in Lowe, 65
these future plaintiffs will be replaced by people within the protected
category and it will help to have rules for "substantially younger" settled when they plan their prima facie cases.
Kurt Schaub*

168. See Lowe v. Commack Sch. Dist., 886 F.2d 1364, 1379-80 (1st Cir. 1979).
* I would like to acknowledge the love and patience of my wife, Karen Elise Schaub.
Without her support, this Note could not have been written.
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